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Abstract
This contribution assesses the impact of spatial and non-spatial (postage
stamp) network pricing schemes on market outcomes in deregulated electricity
supply. Our analytical framework is a combination of spatial microeconomics
and the theory of vertically related markets. The setting is characterized by a
network monopoly remaining vertically integrated to one of the producers and
at the same time providing an essential input to the entire industry, including
its competitors. Our ﬁndings reveal some unexpected preferences towards
these arrangement from the consumer-, ﬁrm- and welfare-perspective.
JEL-classiﬁcations: D43, L22, L94, R321 Introduction
Beginning in the 1980s, the electricity sector has seen sweeping reforms in many
countries around the world. Starting from vertically integrated regional or national
monopolies, numerous prposals have been made and various arrangements are about
to emerge. This variety stems on the one hand from nation-speciﬁc physical, insti-
tutional and political backgrounds, on the other hand there persists a lack of un-
derstanding as to the functioning of this market (on the economic fundamentals of
electricity deregulation see e.g. Joskow/Schmalensee (1983)).
This contribution assesses the impact of spatial and non-spatial pricing tech-
niques on market outcomes in deregulated electricity supply. Our analytical frame-
work is a combination of the theory of spatial pricing and the theory of vertically
related markets. A model of the traditional regional monopolies with vertical in-
tegration serves as a point of reference . The deregulated framework is character-
ized by a monopolistic transmission-network (upstream) and competitive production
(downstream). The monopolistic network remains vertically integrated with one of
the competitive producers, and at the same time acts as an essential input-facility to
all producers, making its access-conditions pivotal to the reforms. In this setting, we
construct two alternative models to address one of the key issues under discussion:
Uniform delivered pricing downstream coupled withdistance-speciﬁc transmission
prices upstream versus uniform delivered pricing on bothmarket stages. Th e lat-
ter system corresponds witha type of transmission pricing commonly referred to as
postage stamp pricing, for its analogy withth e customary practice in national postal
services: A postage stamp rate is a ﬁxed charge per unit transmitted, regardless of
the economic distance the energy travels. In the former model, by contrast, trans-
mission rates are sensitive to distance, accounting for the speciﬁc costs an economic
transaction causes in the transportation network due to the location-ﬁgure between
production, grid pattern, and consumption.
The speciﬁc aim of this contribution is threefold: Firstly, the strategic pric-
ing behaviour on both, the monopolistic and the competitive stage shall be made
visible. This embraces the question: Does an unregulated, vertically integrated
network-monopolist set prices in a way that completely excludes competition from
1its traditional market area? In other words, is there an incentive for complete vertical
foreclosure (Hart/Tirole (1990))? Secondly, which arrangement do traditional ﬁrms,
newcomers and consumers favour respectively? Thirdly, the short-run welfare-eﬀects
of bothcases sh all be elaborated in order to uncover (static) eﬃciency-implications
accrueing from the (dis-)regard of space in transmission pricing. We ﬁnd that the
preferences of the economic agents vis-a-vis the spatial or non-spatial pricing policies
deviate in part from intuition. Most importantly, it turns out that postage stamp
tariﬀs are accompanied by short-run welfare losses. There is only fuzzy awareness of
the economic costs the total abolishment of spatial components in network-pricing
brings about, which tend to be neglegted in political debate (Monopolkommission
(2000)). Yet, they have to be wheighed against the presumed advantages of the
simpler postage stamp pricing (Hobbs/Schuler (1986)).
The theory of vertically related markets (for an early survey see Perry (1989)) is a
branch of industrial economics, which has gained considerable popularity in the con-
text of deregulating network industries. Many contributions are particularly deal-
ing withvertical structures in telecommunication markets (e.g. Economides/Salop
(1992), Laﬀont/Tirole (1994), Economides (1998)), which are, unlike the electricity
sector, characterized by certain substitutionary relationships between the monopo-
listic and the competitive stages as well as by signiﬁcant network externalities. A
theoretical treatment of the vertical structures especially in electricity economics is
carried out by Brunekreeft (1997) and Meran/Schwarze (1998). A number of au-
thors are committed to the optimal allocation of (scarce) network capacity (Hogan
(1992), Chao/Peck (1996), Armstrong et al. (1996) and Tabors (1996)). Yet none of
the named approaches is explicitly spatial and focussed on a comparison of postage
stamp pricing with other proposal. The distorting properties of uniform delivered
pricing are well-known in regional science (DeCanio (1984)). An extensive applica-
tion of spatial pricing theory on the deregulation of electric utilities is undertaken
by Hobbs/Schuler (1985), (1986) und Hobbs (1986). These authors, however, do not
account for the vertical relationship within the sector, which turns out to be a cru-
cial aspect of deregulation. A theoretical exploration of both vertical structures and
spatial markets can be found in e.g. Bittlingmayer (1983), McBride (1983), Sch¨ oler
(1989), and Gupta et al. (1999). In its vertical architecture the model of Gupta
2et al. is closest to the requirements of our speciﬁc application, with a monopolistic
input- and a competitive retail-market.
Special to the present study is the treatment of transport as a distinct market
stage withendogenously determined transmission- or access-rates. Th e only similar
approachcan be found in Sch uler/Holah an (1978). Common analysis on spatial
oligopolies assumes transport at constant, exogenously set fright rates per distance
and quantity unit. In this view transport is either supplied by each ﬁrm internally
at constant marginal costs, or the transport market is perfectly competitive. We
explore the case of monopolistic transport infrastructure as an input facility: The
transport charge is derived in the optimization program of the network operater,
whose decision inﬂuences the behaviour of the competing producers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the
theoretical framework by deﬁning the basic assumptions. As a simpliﬁed picture of
traditional regional monopolies, we give a brief replication of the spatial monopoly
withuniform delivered pricing. Sections 3 and 4 eachare dedicated to one model in
detail, the spatial oligopoly with uniform delivered pricing downstream and vertical
integration (oli-udp-vi, section 3) as well as the oligopoly with uniform delivered
pricing on bothmarket stages and vertical integration (oli-udp2-vi, section 4). In
section 5 the market results are compared and discussed with respect to our above-
mentioned objective.
2 Basic framework and status quo ante
The assumptions presented below largely rest on the standard spatial pricing litera-
ture (eg. Capozza/Van Order (1978)), while our modiﬁcations and extensions direct
the analysis to the application outlined above. The stylized functional courses as
well as the simplistic representation of space serves to reduce mathematical com-
plexity. These simpliﬁcations allow us to derive consistent evidence to the problem
at hand. Assumptions 1-7 shall be equally valid in all models considered.
3General assumptions
Assumption 1: Homogenous demand continuously occupies one-dimensional space
at uniform density equal to 1 per distance unit.
Assumption 2: Consumers purchase electrical energy from the cheapest supplier at
their location at a distance r from the site of production. Individual demand q
is a linear function of the delivered price p:
q =1− p. (1)
Assumption 3: There are two market-stages, referred to as upstream and down-
stream respectively. The network operator acts upstream providing its output,
transportation services, to producers (generators). The upstream output em-
braces high- and medium-voltage transmission, local distribution as well as other
network functions, which are not distinguished hereafter. Producers act on the
downstream stage, utilising the network services as an input for selling the ﬁnal
good, electricity, at their customers locations. Generation and transmission are
fully complementary products (Brunekreeft (1996)). Economies of scope between
these stages are assumed not to exist. All ﬁrms strive for maximal proﬁts.
Assumption 4: Production is characterized by constant variable costs 0 <k<1
per quantity unit and ﬁxed costs K. Withrespect to production tech nology
all generating ﬁrms are identical. The product is not storable. Transmission is
accompanied by distance- and quantity-related marginal costs τ as well as ﬁxed
costs costs F.
Assumption 5: The number of ﬁrms active on a particular fraction of the market
in space is exogenously given in each modell. The diﬀerence between the back-
ground case and the deregulated cases lies in the ﬁrst round of market entry by
newcomers. In our models, further entry does not occur. Therefore we permit
positive proﬁts, π>0, to sustain. Once taken, ﬁrms’ locations are ﬁxed. These
features, combined with the above-mentioned cost-structure, establish a short-run
analysis.
4Assumption 6: The sector is subject to regulatory conditions in two respects: Firstly,
supply is to be exhaustive, i.e. provision is unbroken in space by rule. This implies
that market areas of neighbouring ﬁrms always border on one another. Secondly,
downstream ﬁrms are obliged to apply one single price per unit to consumers in
all parts of their service area, i.e. to make use of uniform delivered pricing.
Assumption 7: All ﬁrms run exactly one production site at location L within their
market area of length R. The transmission grid does not have one physical
location. It rather stretches all across linear space, being managerially attached
and devided by ownership. Each vertically integrated (former) monopolist runs
a network infrastructure the size of its traditional service area.
Background case
Since we assume identical conditions for eachsingle generator and eachvertically
integrated ﬁrm in space (assumption 4) it suﬃces to restrict our analysis to the
service area of one network operator. The extend of this area evolves in the situation
before liberalisation, which shall be sketched in the following. All symbols relating
to this monopolist carry the subscript m. For the representation of the status qou
ante of liberalization we need an additional assumption.
Assumption 8a: All ﬁrms are vertically integrated across the entire functions up-
stream and downstream. Eachenjoys exclusive righ ts over its service territory,
the size of which, 2Rm results from the individual ﬁrm’s free choice.
For supply to be exhaustive, ﬁrms arrange themselves such that neighbouring mar-
ket areas always border on each other. Thus, the locational pattern follows from
assumptions 6 and 8a. Figure 1 illustrates this spatial conﬁguration.
The situation within the part of space looked upon, i.e. within an individual
ﬁrm’s market reachof Rm in eachdirection, is equivalent to th e textbook case
























Figure 1: Spatial conﬁguration in the background case
withrespect to th e delivered price, pm, yields the optimal values for the ﬁrm’s price
p∗
m, the market area border R∗
m, total consumption Qm, and proﬁt at these values:
p
∗
m =( k +2 ) /3, (3)
R
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m)=4 ( 1− k)
3/27τ − F − K. (6)
Consumer surplus Λ shows the aggregate advantage accrueing to consumers from





m)=2 ( 1− k)
3/27τ. (7)
Social welfare is measured in the tradition of industrial economics as the sum of





m)=2 ( 1− k)
3/9τ. (8)
The size of an individual market area 2R∗
m constitutes the terrain, on which
we examine competition within the subsequent modells. The spatial order of the
vertically integrated ﬁrms follows this distance-pattern hereafter.
3 Model: Oligopoly, vertical integration, uniform
delivered pricing downstream
Now, liberalization of the sector opens the downstream market to competition, i.e.
amongst producers. Assumption 8a needs replacement in this model. Instead, as-
sumptions 8b, 9a and 10 establishth e new situation.
6Assumption 8b: Two generating ﬁrms enter the scene, competing downstream with
the vertically integrated ﬁrm. The latter ﬁrm’s monopoly position with respect
to the transportation facilities is maintained.
From this constellation the crucial role of the grid arises. The transmission network
is the monopolistic bottleneck the newcomers need to pass in order to reach their
customers at the places of consumption. By control over the terms of access the ver-
tically integrated ﬁrm determines part of the conditions of downstream competition.
All symbols relating to the vertically integrated ﬁrm are marked by the subscript
vi, those of the newcommers carry the subscript j.
Assumption 9a: The vertically integrated ﬁrm charges foreign producers a transmis-
sion price t per distance and quantity unit.




(1 − pj)(k + tr)dr + K. (9)




r(1 − pvi)dr +2 τ
Rj 
0
r(1 − pj)dr +2 kRvi(1 − pvi)+K + F. (10)
The former couple of terms symbolyse variable costs within the grid, which stem
from delivering to the ﬁrm’s own and to the foreign ﬁrms’ customers respectively.
The third term signiﬁes variable costs in the generation-unit.
Figure 2 serves to visualize the arrangement of locations and market areas in
the liberalized case. The focus is put on a fraction of linear space by the length
of 2Rm, which is the market area presented at the center of ﬁgure 1 zoomed in.
Since the delivery to consumers causes costs which are sensitive to distance, it is
the newcomers’ rational choice to locate in points Lj at the former market borders,
where they are the furthest apart from the traditional ﬁrm’s location Lvi.P r e s u m i n g
identical new producers (asssumption 4), withequal conditions to bothsides of th eir
markets, we can simplify the approach from two halves to one full newcomer on the













Figure 2: Spatial conﬁguration in the deregulated cases
In order to depict the behaviour of ﬁrms, an assumption regarding the distribu-
tion of information across them and the conjectures they hold is neccessary.
Assumption 10: We track a two-stage game withasymmetric information. Th e
vertically integrated ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt πvi withrespect to bothprices pvi
and t in forsight of the other ﬁrms’ rational choice. The latter maximize their
proﬁt πj withrespect to th eir price pj and their desired market reach R∗
j taking
t as given, i.e. under the zero-conjecture dt/dpj =0 .
Assumption 10 implies the following formal proceeding: In a ﬁrst step the new-
comers’ price-reaction as a function the transmission charge, p∗
j(t), is derived. In
a second step the integrated ﬁrm employs this information in determining its opti-
mal pricing t∗ and p∗
vi. Finally, by substitution the necomers’ price p∗
j,t hes i z eo f
individual market areas as well as proﬁt, and welfare results can be calculated.
Downstream proﬁt is given by
πj =2 ( 1− pj)
Rj 
0
(pj − k − tr)dr − K. (11)
Looking at gross proﬁt equal to zero, pj − (k + tRj) = 0, we can solve the furthest
sales-distance, Rj =( pj − k)/t. The objective function then simpliﬁes to
πj =( 1− pj)(k − pj)/t − K. (12)
First and second order conditions, ∂πj/∂pj =0a n d∂2πj/∂p2








j(t)=2 ( 1− k)/3t. (14)
8If bothtypes of ﬁrms made plans independently, an overlapping area would
occur, which both would wish to serve. This easily follows from the fact that the
integrated ﬁrm’s optimization prolem would correspond to the background case,
yielding the entire area available, 2R∗
m. Any consumer potentially served from the
newcomers inhabits the same section of space. We are faced with the well-known
conﬂict of spatial oligopoly in the presence of uniform delivered pricing. For the
resolution of a spatial equilibrium in this case, there are a number of proposal in
the literatur, mainly to be distinguished with respect the intensity of competition in
the market (Beckmann (1973), Gronberg/Meyer (1981), Schuler/Hobbs (1982), and
Sch¨ oler (1988), pp. 233-238). Our situation, however, is distinct from the commonly
investigated cases by its speciﬁc asymmetry between the economic agents looked
upon: The network-operator is informed about the newcomers’ behaviour and sets
two prices, pvi as well as t, inﬂuencing by this means the size of its competitors
market. These particularities evoke a diﬀerent parititon of the contested area.
The integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt function expresses revenue and costs accrueing up-
stream as well as downsteam:







Taking the identity Rvi = Rm − Rj as well as the newcomers’ decision, R∗
j(t)a n d
p∗
j(t), into account we ﬁnd how the integrated ﬁrm can control the spatial partition
through the network charge t:
Rvi(t)=2 ( 1− k)/3τ − 2(1 − k)/3t. (16)
Utilizing equations (13), (14) und (16) and rearranging terms we get
πvi(t,pvi)=[ 4 ( 1 − k)(k
2τ(t − τ)+k(3pvi(t − τ)(2t + τ) − 6t
2 + τ(t +5 τ))
+9p
2
vit(τ − t)+3 pvi(t − τ)(4t − τ) − 3t
2 + τ(7t − 4τ)]/(27t
2τ)
−F − K (17)
subject to simultaneous maximization withrespect to pvi and t. The necessary con-
ditions ∂πvi/∂pvi =0a n d∂πvi/∂t = 0 form a system of equations yielding three so-
lutions for each price, amongst which two are economically admissable. Checking the
9suﬃcient conditions, ∂2πvi/∂p2
vi < 0, ∂2πvi/∂t2 < 0a n d( ∂2πvi/∂p2
vi)(∂2πvi/∂t2) >



















Consequently, optimal delivered prices of the two types of ﬁrms diﬀer, and because
of 0 <k<1 we always have p∗
vi <p ∗
j. The optimal transmission price, t∗,a m o u n t s


















Thus, the integrated ﬁrm serves an area about 2.7-times the size of its competitors
spatial market, independent of the cost parameter values, k and τ.I td o e sn o te x -
clude the newcomers through prohibitively high transmission pricing. This outcome
can be traced back to the following trade oﬀ: Starting from the monopoly situa-
tion withtransport price suﬃciently h ighto act as disincentives for market-entry to
occur, the integrated ﬁrm weighes up proﬁt-drawbacks downstream through letting
customers switch to the competitors and additional gross proﬁts upstream through
transmission sales to the competitors at the fringes. These countervailing eﬀects on




vi and t∗ from equations (13), (18) and (19) takes us to the re-






































10Equations (23) and (24) tell a ﬁxed ratio of gross proﬁts: πvi+F +K/πj +K ≈ 4.2,
again independent of cost-parameter values1.




































This value is called on to measure short-run eﬃciency when contrasted to the ﬁndings
of our subsequent model.
4 Model: Oligopoly, vertical integration, uniform
delivered pricing upstream and downstream
This section portrayes the postage stamp case. Aussumption 1-7, 8b and 10 are kept
valid. The general spatial conﬁguration continues to follow ﬁgure 2. The diﬀerence
in the design of our models lies in a modiﬁcation of assumption 9a through 9b and
a supplement to our rules of the game assumption 10) by assumption 11.
Assumption 9b: For transportation services the newcomers pay a price t which
purely quantitiy-related. The renumeration of the network services is not sensi-
tive to distance.
In the terminoligy of the political debate, here, transmission pricing is replaced
by the simplest form of access pricing, the postage stamp. Formally, we are dealing
with a downstream market which is not spatial. There is no clear spatial assignment
of individual production to individual demand2.The variable costs upstream remain
sensitive to distance.
Assumption 11: The newcomers assume the prices of their competitors to be ﬁxed,
i.e. their price conjecture is given by dqvi/dqj =1 .
11As opposed to equation (9), the cost function of a market entrant simpliﬁes to
Cj =2 Rmqj(k + t)+K. (27)
The multiplication with the number of places, 2Rm, is undertaken because the com-
mercial contracts of all ﬁrms spread evenly accros the entire area under investigation.
Total costs of the integrated ﬁrm generally resemble the functional course known
from equation (10). Changes are due to the fact that at every location the jointly
determined quantity, q = qvi + qj, is delivered, and some special information on
physical transmission distances enters:







r(qvi + qj)dr + K + F. (28)
The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of the cost-equation depicts variable production
costs, the second term variable grid-costs from delivery of self-generated electric-
ity, and the third term reﬂects variable grid costs arising from foreign generation.
Equation (28) takes account of the physical law, that in electricity networks the
real source of electrical energy always is the closest one with alvailable capacity.
In this way, physical transactions, i.e. the actual distance energy travels, are not
directly linked to economic transactions between production and consumption. The
upper limits of integration represent the respective market shares, transferred to the
actually delivered market areas.
Competition downstream at every location and all across space equals a non-
spatial oligopoly, the multiplication of demand by the number of places, 2Rm, put
aside. Newcomers downstream are facing the Cournot-type of maximization prob-
lem. Inverse demand from equation (1) can be speciﬁed to
p =1− (qvi + qj). (29)
The proﬁt function of newcomers reads
πj =2 Rmqj((1 − qj − qvi) − k − t) − K. (30)
12By maximization of equation (30) withrespect to quantity qj we derive the reaction









j is a function of the other ﬁrm’s quantity qvi and of the network access
fee t. From a newcomer’s point of view the latter is an exogenous part of variable
costs. However, within our model it follows endogenously from the integrated ﬁrm’s
decision.
The integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt takes the form
πvi =2 Rmtqj +2 Rmqvi((1 − qvi − qj) − k) − Cvi. (32)
Making use of the information about its competitors available from equation (31),
taking into account the cost-structure (equation (28)), and substituting Rm,p r o ﬁ t
can be rewritten as a function of the integrated ﬁrm’s choice variables qvi and t
alone:
πvi(qvi,t)=2 ( k − 1)(k
3 + k
2(5qvi +5 t − 3) + k(5q
2
vi +2 qvi(t − 5) + (t − 1)




vi(3t − 5) + qvi(1 − t)(3t +5 )+( t − 1)
2
(3t − 1))/(9τ(k − qvi + t − 1)) − K − F. (33)
Due to formal complexity, in this model the optimal values t∗ and p∗
vi cannot be
determined through common simultaneous maximization. Instead we approximate
the proﬁt-maximizing values employing the following method: Heuristic substitution
of values for the quantity ratio 0 < (qj/qvi) < 1, under consideration of the reaction
function from equation (30), permits one-dimensional optimization withrespect to t.
Commencing with qj = 0 we observe the integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt to increase up to its
peak in two-dimensional πvi-space. The corresponding optimal q∗
vi−t∗−Kombination
calculated in this manner reads:
t




vi = qi =0 .2492(1 − k). (35)
13This quantity corresponds with a ratio q∗
vi/q∗




j =0 .1187(1 − k). (36)
As above, the vertically integrated agent does obviously have an incentive to leave
part of the downstream-market to its competitors, driven by corresponding revenue
upstream. The relation t>τholds true for the postage stamp access price as
well, since only positive gross proﬁts of the upstream-devision allow a market-share
of qj/q > 0 to occur. The exact ratio t/τ cannot not be found withanonymous
parameters k and τ. The optimal values t∗, q∗
vi and q∗
j yield all further market- and










The delivered price, which is uniform for all consumers, follows from equation (28):
p
∗ =0 .3679k +0 .6321. (38)
















Again we observe a ﬁxed ratio of gross proﬁts, namely (πvi + K + F)/(πj + K) ≈
10.6, which is clearly more accentuated in favour af the integrated ﬁrm than in the
preceeding case.
By means of consumer surplus we inspect the desireability of a case on behalf of




















This measure teaches us about the social desirability of the arrangement at hand in
terms of eﬃciency.
145 Discussion
In this concluding section the ﬁndings of our formal analysis are systematically
summarized and interpreted. To ease comparison the results are rounded to four
decimals and collected in table 1. The values yielded in optimum are assigned to
rows, whereas each column is assigned to one model respectively. The abbreviations
mon-udp-vi, oli-udp1-vi and oli-udp2-vi signify the models presented in section 2
(background case), section 3 and section 4 (postage stamp case) in the named order.
In table 1, to restrict our view to the essentials, we replace expression (1 − k)b y
ψ,a n d( K + F)b yV .T he m a r k e t a r e a t e r m s , R∗
j and R∗
vi, in model oli-udp2-
vi reﬂect the physically delivered distances, i.e. the market shares translated to
space. Contrasting the market results outlined in table 1 with one another enables
value/ model mon-udp-vi oli-udp1-vi oli-udp2-vi
price p∗
j –0 ,3333k +0 ,6667 0,3679k +0 ,6321
price p∗
m resp. p∗
vi 0,3333k +0 ,6667 0,3783k +0 ,6217 0,3679k +0 ,6321
network charge t∗ [τ]3 ,7026τ 0,5134ψ
area R∗
j –0 ,1801ψ/τ 0,2151ψ/τ
area R∗
m resp. R∗
vi 0,6667ψ/τ 0,4866ψ/τ 0,4516ψ/τ
proﬁt πj –0 ,0400ψ3/τ − K 0,0188ψ3/τ − K
proﬁt πm resp. πvi 0,1481ψ3/τ − V 0,1685ψ3/τ − V 0,1992ψ3/τ − V
total demand Q 0,4444ψ2/τ 0,4883ψ2/τ 0,4905ψ2/τ
consumer surplus Λ 0,0747ψ3/τ 0,0897ψ3/τ 0,0902ψ3/τ
welfare Ω 0,2222ψ3/τ 0,3771ψ3/τ 0,3082ψ3/τ
Table 1: Market and welfare results
to draw some interesting conclusions withrespect to th e above-stated objectives.
Speciﬁcally, the outcomes can be interpreted thus:
• In bothderegulated arrangements, network pricing does not exert complete
vertical foreclosure. The integrated ﬁrm does have an incentive to welcome
market entry3. The intuition behind this lies in the solution of a trade oﬀ-
3These ﬁndings are in line with those derived by Brunekreeft (1997) in a non-spatial context.
15relation between shrinking revenue downstream and rising revenue upstream,
bothcoming along withmarket entry.
• Locational electricity prices are lower or at most equally as high as before
deregulation. The lowest consumer price is set by the integrated ﬁrm in case
oli-udp1-vi. Network charges are in both deregulated regimes a strategic in-
strument of the grid operator. In both cases, they surpass marginal costs
associated withnetwork usage.
• The emerging interests of the economic agents involved deviate in part from
those commonly assumed:
– In our setting, all ﬁrms stand to gain from deregulation. Strikingly, new-
comers are better oﬀ withdistance-speciﬁc transmission pricing, wh ereas
the integrated ﬁrm prefers postage stamp tariﬀs. In the presence of the
latter pricing-regime the ratio of gross-proﬁts is clearly stronger in favour
of the integrated ﬁrm. This evidence contradicts the view, distance re-
lated pricing components as suchwere th e central instrument of tradi-
tional service providers to save their incumbencies to the disadvantage
of competitors. In this light, the lobbying of ﬁrms might be worth some
rethinking.
– Deregulation is to the advantage of consumers. They enjoy their great-
est surplus in competition withgrid-pricing of th e postage stamp type,
although this preference appears to be weak.
• Welfare eﬀects exhibit an increase of eﬃciency after deregulation. The most
important result emerges from a comparison of the deregulated arrangements:
The sum of consumer and producer surplus is higher in the presence of distance-
speciﬁc transmission-pricing. We detect short-run eﬃciency losses associated
withpostage stamp pricing.
All these ﬁndings are derived and valid within the analytical framework outlined
above. To put them into perspective, some critical aspects of the analyis shall be
identiﬁed. In this context the abscence of regulation, the role of distance in grid
costs and the rigidity of locations deserve some attention.
16The traditional design of electricity supply includes regulatory control to vari-
ous extends, which we abstact from. Therefore in the comparison of results with
the background case this should be kept in mind. However, excess proﬁts earned
by traditional service companies were part of the impetus for liberalization in the
ﬁrst place, putting the eﬀectiveness of the exerted regulation into question. In the
deregulated cases we deliberately forego price-regulation in order to obtain a clear
view of the eﬀects of market power exploited through the infrastructure monopoly.
In practice, the handling of the network ranges from state-owned to privately run
in the absence of regulatory measures (for Germany, see BDI/VIK/VDEW (1999)).
Implementing and assessing price-regulation-techniques in our framework, indeed,
is a worthwhile tasks for future research.
The relevance of the present analysis hinges on the existence of short term
spatially related costs in electricity networks (Annahme 4) and the possibility of
ascribing them to speciﬁc transactions. The transmission of electricity induces
coordination-costs and line-losses rising withdistance. Th e latter require, depending
on voltage and capacity usage, extra generation of up to 10 percent (Scherer (1977),
Bolle (1990), O’Neill (1997)). Ascribing these short-run costs to speciﬁc deliveries
in a multi-line network, however, is technically diﬃcult with possible approxima-
tion in line-ﬂow simulations. According to Kirchoﬀ’s laws electricity inductions and
withdrawals change line ﬂows all across the interconnected grid following the way
of least resistance and subject capacity constraints. Therefore, taking the network
pattern as given, each induction and associated withdrawal in the grid causes spe-
ciﬁc costs that hinge on its location relative to the given grid pattern and all other
users but is not directly linked to geographic distances. Therefore, for our line of
reasoning to make sense it is essential to strictly stick to economic space, as is usual
in spatial economics: Locations are to be deﬁned points in space relative to given
grid capacities as well as to other production and consumption (Bohn et al. (1984,
S. 361-369), Woo et al. (1995, S. 111-112)), i.e. reﬂecting costs of service. Interpret-
ing our results in this sense the distances grid-pricing should be based on must not
be measured in terms of physical geography. Much rather a zonal or spot pricing
system as proposed by Schweppe et al. (1988) where economic distance indirectly
enters through the addition of location- or zone. speciﬁc prices calculated for both
17sides of the market. Such systems are practiced in e.g. England and Wales (Green
(1997)), whereas in Germany the postage stamp regime is presently in duty.
Restricting the analysis to the short run, as embodied in an exogenous number
of ﬁrms and locational rigidity, is common to the analysis of deregulated electricity
networks (Boucher/Smeers (1999)). Nevertheless, it signiﬁes, that not all inﬂuences
of (non-)spatial price signals are captured. According to e.g. Chao/Peck (1996) and
Bushnell/Stoﬀt (1997) eﬃciency eﬀects through capacity- and locational decisions
of network-pricing are at work in the long run, in particular. An adequate treatment
of these long-run mechanisms escapes the scope of our framework. The intuition is,
that disconnecting locational considerations from existing spatial scarcities through
the introduction of postage stamp transport charges induces misleaded locational
decisions, and negative welfare eﬀects in suit. Accepting this view, these long-run
eﬀects carry the same sign as those derived in this paper. The direction of the
combinded inﬂuence on eﬃciency is unequivocal.
Thus, if the simpliﬁcation of network-pricing schemes by the abolishment of
location- or distance-speciﬁc components induces tranparency, intensiﬁed competi-
tion and - as the popular argument goes - enhanced productivity in suit, these gains
have to be weighed against the negative welfare eﬀects caused by the disregard of
relevant distances. Too little attention is being paid to the latter side of the named
trade oﬀ. This contribution attempts to shed some light on possible short-run eﬃ-
ciency losses associated withpostage stamp network pricing in a th eoretical analysis
under special consideration of the debate’s central element, i.e. space.
Footnotes
1. A similar regularity of relative proﬁts in vertically related spatial markets is detected
by Sch¨ oler (1989).
2. Strictly speaking, the locational choice of newcomers is indetermined as well. As-
suming, however, that they do not know a priori which of the regimes occurs, they
position themselves in the same way as with distance-related transmission pricing.
18Literatur
Armstrong, Marc/Chris Doyle/John Vickers (1995): The Access Pricing Problem. In:
Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 44, pp. 132-150.
BDI/VIK/VDEW (1999): Verb¨ andevereinbarung ¨ uber Kriterien zur Bestimmung von Net-
znutzungsentgelten f¨ ur elektrische Energie. Berlin/Essen/Frankfurt.
Beckmann, Martin J. (1968): Location Theory.N e wY o r k .
Beckmann, Martin J. (1973): Spatial Oligopoly as a Noncooperative Game. In: Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 2, pp. 263-268.
Bittlingmayer, George (1983): A Model of Vertical Restriction and Equilibrium in Retail-
ing. In: Journal of Business, Vol. 56, pp. 477-496.
Bohn, Roger E./Michael C. Caramanis/Fred C. Schweppe (1984): Optimal Pricing in
Electrical Networks over Space and Time. In: Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15,
pp. 360-376.
Bolle, Friedel (1990):Wettbewerb und Kooperation in der Elektrizit¨ atswirtschaft.S c h r i f t e n
des Energiewirtschaftlichen Instituts, Vol. 39, M¨ unchen.
Boucher, Jacqueline/Yves Smeers (1999): Alternative Models of Restructured Electricity
Systems - Part 1: No Market Power. CORE Discussion Paper, Nr. 9950. Louvain-la-
Neuve.
Brunekreeft, Gert (1997): Open Access vs. Common Carriage in Electricity Supply. In:
Energy Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 225-238.
Bushnell, James B./Steven E. Stoft (1997): Improving Private Incentives for Electric Grid
Investment. In: Resource and Energy Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 85-108.
Capozza, Dennis R./Robert Van Order (1978): A Generalized Model of Spatial Competi-
tion. In: American Economic Review, Vol. 68, pp. 896-908.
Chao, Hung-Po/Stephen Peck (1996): A Market Mechanism For Electric Power Transmis-
sion. In: Journal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 25-59.
DeCanio, Stephen J. (1984): Delivered Pricing and Multiple Basing Point Equilibria - a
Reevaluation. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, pp. 329-349.
Economides, Nicholas (1998): The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an Input
Monopolist. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 16, pp. 271-
284.
19Economides, Nicholas/Steven C. Salop (1992): Competition and Integration among Com-
plements, and Network Market Structure. In: Journal of Industrial Economics,V o l .
40, pp. 105-123.
Green, Richard J. (1997): Transmision Pricing in England and Wales. In: Utilities Policy,
Vol. 6, pp. 185-193.
Gronberg, Timothy/Jack Meyer (1981): Competitive Equilibria in Uniform Delivered Pric-
ing. In: American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp. 758-763.
Gupta, Barnali/John pp. Heywood/Debashis Pal (1999): The Strategic Choice of Location
and Transport Mode in a Successive Monopoly Model. In: Journal of Regional Science,
Vol. 39, pp. 525-537.
Hart, Oliver/Jean Tirole (1990): Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure. In: Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp. 205-286.
Hobbs, Benjamin F. (1986): Network Models of Spatial Oligopoly with an Application to
Deregulation of Electricity Generation. In: Operations Research, Vol. 34, pp. 395-409.
Hobbs, Benjamin F./Richard E. Schuler (1985): An Assessment of the Deregulation of
Electric Power Generation using Network Models of Imperfect Spatial Markets. In:
Papers of the Regional Science Association, Vol. 57, pp. 75-89.
Hobbs, Benjamin F./Richard E. Schuler (1986): Deregulating the Distribution of Elec-
tricity - Price and Welfare Consequences of Spatial Oligopoly with Uniform Delivered
Prices. In: Journal of Regional Science, Vol. 26, pp. 235-265.
Hogan, William W. (1992): Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission. In: Jour-
nal of Regulatory Economics, Vol. 4, pp. 211-242.
Joskow, Paul L./Richard Schmalensee (1983): Markets for Power - an Analysis of Electric
Utility Deregulation. Camebridge (Mass.).
Laﬀont, Jean-Jacques/Jean Tirole (1994): Access Pricing and Competition. In: European
Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 1673-1710.
McBride, Mark E. (1983): Spatial Competition and Vertical Integration: Cement and
Concrete Revisited. In: American Economic Review, Vol. 73, pp. 1011-1022.
Meran, Georg/Reimund Schwarze (1998): Pitfalls in Restructuring the Electricity Industry.
Diskussionspapier 1998/17, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Dokumentation, Technische
Universit¨ at Berlin.
Monopolkommision (2000): Wettbewerbspolitik in Netzstrukturen. Dreizehntes Hauptgut-
achten gem¨ aß 44 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GWB - 1998/1999 -, Bonn.
20O’Neill, Richard P. (1997): Short Term Electric Markets - ISOs, Information, the Incon-
venience of Non-Convexity, and Inappropriate Behaviour. Oﬃce of Economic Policy
Discussion Paper, April 1997, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Perry, Martin K. (1989): Vertical Integration: Determinants and Eﬀects. In: R. Schmalen-
see/Robert D. Willig (Hrsg.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. I, Amsterdam,
pp. 183-260.
Scherer, Charles C. (1977): Estimating Electric Power System Marginal Costs.A m s t e r -
dam.
Sch¨ oler, Klaus (1988): R¨ aumliche Preistheorie - Eine partialanalytische Untersuchung kon-
tinuierlicher Wirtschaftsr¨ aume. Berlin.
Sch¨ oler, Klaus (1989): Competitive Retailing and Monopolistic Wholesaling in a Spatial
Market. In: Annals of Regional Science, Vol. 23, pp. 19-28.
Schuler, Richard E./Benjamin F. Hobbs (1982): Spatial Price Duopoly under Uniform
Delivered Pricing. In: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 175-187.
Schuler, Richard E./William L. Holahan (1978): Competition vs. Vertical Integration
of Transportation and Production in a Spatial Economy. In: Papers of the Regional
Science Association, Vol. 41, pp. 209-225.
Schweppe, Fred C./Michael C. Caraminis/Richard D. Tabors/Roger E. Bohn (1988): Spot
Pricing of Electricity.B o s t o n .
Tabors, Richard D. (1996): A Market Based Proposal for Transmission Pricing. In: Elec-
tricity Journal, Vol. 9, pp. 61-67.
Woo, Chi-Keung/Debra Lloyd-Zannetti/Ren Orans/Brian Horri/Grayson Heﬀner (1995):
Marginal Capacity Costs of Electricty Distribution and Demand for Distributed Gen-
eration. In: Energy Journal, Vol. 16, pp. 111-130.
21